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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance structures and firm performance 
of listed firms on Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) in Sri Lanka. Data were collected from 174 firms in the 
financial year 2010 and multiple regression analysis were used to examine whether the existing corporate 
governance mechanisms influence the firm performance of listed firms in Sri Lanka. The study found evidence 
that, (i) board size and proportion of non- executive directors in the board shows a marginal negative relationship 
with firm value, (ii) proportion of non-executive directors in a board and financial performance of firm shows 
negative relation contrary to the findings of previous studies. The firm size and director shareholdings have a 
significant impact on firm performance of listed firms in Sri Lanka.  
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1 Introduction 
The concerns and discussions on corporate governance has been a popular issue in developed countries 
and widely researched. These discussions date back to early 1930s since the theory of separation of 
ownership and control [1]. However, corporate governance was triggered in developing countries such 
as Sri Lanka with the recent corporate collapses. The need for effective corporate governance is 
evidenced and reactionary governance reforms have been instigated to prevent such events happening 
again to protect the interest of investors in developing countries.  
In the Sri Lankan context, the issue pertaining to corporate governance had been increasingly spoken of 
in the recent past and the revised and expanded Code of Best Practice (CBP) on corporate governance 
was introduced in 2008. Despite significant efforts to put regulatory frame work for corporate 
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governance in Sri Lanka, studies on corporate governance practices at the firm level and their effects 
on firm performance is largely lacking. 
2 Objective of the study 
The objective of the study was to examine whether the existing corporate governance mechanisms 
influence the firm performance in Sri Lanka. This study is also notable in a number of ways; firstly, the 
study will contribute to the existing body of knowledge concerning corporate governance practices on 
firm performance of listed firms in Sri Lanka. Secondly, the outcome of this study will help interested 
parties to know the level of compliance of recommendations made in the CBP. 
3 Literature review 
There are contrasting findings that suggest that there may be positive and negative relationship between 
board size and firm performance. It is evident that the large boards are less effective than small boards 
[2, 3]. Contrasting to above it was concluded that the larger board is good for a firm [4]. 
With respect to the board composition, it is found that an increase in the percentage of outside directors 
can improve firm performance [5, 6, 7, 8]. However, number of studies suggested a negative 
relationship between board independence and firm performance [9, 10]. 
The chairman’s role should be separated from that of CEO [11]. Empirically it was concluded that 
firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chairman are separated [3, 12]. However, the firm 
performance improved by combining those roles rather than separating them [13, 14]. 
There are numerous studies that examine the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance. It was evident that insider equity ownership correlates with improved performance [15, 
16]. In contrast, it was found that there is no significant relationship existing between ownership and 
performance. 
In view of the continuing debate surrounding corporate governance mechanism and its relationship 
with firm performance is still an unresolved. 
4 Sample and data 
As at the end of year 2010, there were 243 firms listed on the CSE. Due to different statutory 
requirements, all firms of Bank, Finance and Insurance sector were excluded and 17 other firms were 
also excluded because of difficulties in obtaining the relevant data from the population. Since, the final 
sample was 174 listed firms, relevant data related to corporate governance variables and performance 
measurements were gathered for the year 2010 from the website of the CSE. 
Independent variables which were considered are board size (BSIZE), proportion of non executive 
directors in a board (NED), director’s shareholdings (DHOLD) and CEO duality (CEODUA). The 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q were used as performance measurements and firm size (SIZE) 
measured by turnover was used as the control variable in this study. 
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5 Results and discussion 
The table 01 summarized the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the study. 
Variables N Mean Max Min SD 
Board Size(BSIZE) 174 7.78 14 3 2.125 
Number of NED  174 5.30 12 0 2.533 
Directors Share Holding(DHOL)  174 7.70 70.34 - 16.104 
CEO Duality(CEODU) 174 0.12 1 0 0.3299 
Total Turnover-Rs.’000(SIZE)  174 3234986 63523824 969 9449585 
Return on Assets (ROA) 174 0.08 0.58 -0.22 0.112 
Tobin’s Q 174 1.27 4.12 0.54 1.082 
Table 01: Descriptive Statistics for the year 2010 
The table 01 shows that the average board size of 7.78 directors per board with a standard deviation of 
2.1 with regard to all the 174 firms observed and has a wide range from 3 to 14. This is in far with 
many studies undertaken previously in developed countries. This table also shows that the number of 
non-executive directors per board was 5.3 with a standard deviation of 2.5 and have a range from 0 – 
12. This is fair with compare to the developed markets. 
The results of the multiple regression analysis were presented in the table 02. 
 
Panel A: Regression summary of dependent variable ROA and Tobin’s Q 
 ROA Tobin’s Q 
Variable Coef. St. Err of 
Beta 
t  P value Coef. St. Err of 
Beta 
t  P value 
Intercep   1.34612 0.16138   -0.04702 0.97433 
BSIZE -0.05791 0.07216 -0.82728 0.40937 -0.03379 0.06347 -0.53235 0.64237 
NED -0.08978 0.07394 -1.21419 0.17456 -0.00493 0.06382 -0.07725 0.94373 
DHOLD 0.00611 0.08576 0.07125 0.94480 -0.12936 0.07564 -1.71021 0.07945 
CEODU 0.03124 0.07521 0.41535 0.68713 0.002978 0.06173 0.04824 0.97423 
SIZE 0.28792 0.07248 3.97296 0.00006 -0.00081 0.06311 -0.01283 0.99148 
R2 0.09301    0.35642   
 
N 174    174   
 
Table 02: The relationship between measures of performance and governance structures 
The Panel A of the table 02 indicates that only the size of the firm has a significant impact on ROA. It 
says that larger the size of the firm, ROA will also be higher and vice a versa. Beta coefficient for firm 
size stood at 0.28792 while p-value was 0.0000627. All the other independent variables found to be 
less impact in determining ROA. However, the low explanatory power of the model (R2= 0.093) says 
that model cannot be relied upon as a good way of explaining the impact. 
Relative to the regression run for ROA, model for Tobin’s Q results an R2 of 0.36. This indicating that 
the independent variable explains about 36% of the value of Tobin’s Q. This is fairly a good model and 
it was found that there was a significant negative impact of directors shareholding on the value of 
Tobin’s Q and p-value was almost zero at 95% confidence limit. Beta coefficient was -0.12936 and it 
implies that the value of firm is negatively related with the proportion of the director’s shareholding of 
the firm.  
Nevertheless, none of the other variables shows a significant impact on ROA or Tobin’s Q. 
6 Conclusion: 
The objective of the study was to examine whether the existing corporate governance mechanisms 
influence the firm performance in Sri Lanka. Conclusive notes drawn on the findings of data analysis 
could be summarized as follows. 
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A negative correlation between the proportion of non-executive directors and ROA was found to be 
non significant but it contrary to other findings, indicated a positive relation. No significant correlation 
was found between separation of office of CEO from chairman and performance. 
The relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q and proportion of non-executive directors and 
Tobin’s Q were marginally negative, but the results were not statistically significant. Neither the 
directors’ shareholding nor the separation chairman’s role from CEO had any significant impact on 
firm value. Hence, it could be noted that all the recommendations made in CBP with regard to the 
composition of board has a negative impact on the value of firm measured by Tobin’s Q. 
The results presented in this study were restricted by less number of variables related corporate 
governance and data pertaining to year 2010 were addressed, which limits the generalization of the 
findings,  therefore, it is suggested that future research should be carried out with a large number of 
governance variables and data pertaining at least to three years. 
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